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Lay expertise: Why involve the public in biobank governance? 
 




Key to concerns about public involvement in technology governance is the concept of 
lay expertise, the idea that lay people possess some kind of special knowledge that 
neither trained experts in technology, ethics and social sciences nor professional 
politicians possess. There are at least four different meanings of “lay expert”: (1) Lay 
people who are educated into quasi-experts on a particular issue or technology; (2) 
Lay people who turn themselves into experts in order to challenge scientific experts; 
(3) Lay people with particular knowledge based on tradition and experience; (4) Lay 
people who represent an alternative perspective to expert views because they are non-
experts. The challenge is that lay people are often ignorant in the relevant matters and 
wish to leave governance to experts. Still, there are normative reasons for lay 
engagement, either as stakeholders or as citizens in a deliberative democracy. 
According to the second approach, political decisions should be based on an inclusive 
open debate aimed at the better argument, providing lay people a crucial role in 
governance. In order to include lay people without making them hostage to experts, 
politicians or interest groups, we can engage them in focus group interviews which 
are analysed by social scientists and included in the interdisciplinary debate in 




Today it is almost self-evident that lay people should be involved in the political 
deliberation on how to regulate applications of new technologies, such as genetic 
databases, usually called biobanks. In many other kinds of political controversy, most 
people tend to be satisfied that representative democracy guarantees legitimate 
decision-making, but in applications of new technologies, basing political decisions 
on best available scientific advice is not regarded as sufficient. We need to consult the 
general public to ensure that we reach the right decision. Frequently, even 
technologists engage sociologists to explore public opinions of their activities. This 
may be with a view to either exploring the viability of their planned product in the 
market or to find ways to pre-empt negative public reactions, but in many cases they 
talk as if the public assessment of the products has value in itself, not merely as a 
means for planning market strategies. Likewise, politicians speak of public 
consultations not merely as a way to gain popular support for their decisions but as 
public participation in governance. If the aim of involving the public had been merely 
adjustment of market strategies and policy to accommodate public opinion, using 
professional opinion pollsters would seem a better strategy than the expensive and 
elaborate consultation procedures that are often used. 
 
The key to the increased concern with public involvement in technology governance 
is the concept of lay expertise, which expresses the idea that lay people possess some 
kind of special knowledge that neither trained experts in technology, ethics and social 
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sciences nor professional politicians possess. As Collins and Evans point out, “lay 
expertise” is an oxymoron; it is the expertise of not being an expert.2 The other expert 
groups mentioned above have particular training and practice that enable them to be 
experts, whereas lay people are given expert status due to their lack of such training 
and practice. It is easy to get the impression that it is ignorance that is their expertise - 
that their particular kind of knowledge is lack of knowledge. As we have all other 
kinds of expertise involved in technology governance, we must also have the expertise 
of non-expertise represented. To avoid such paradoxical kinds of reasoning it is 
important to clarify the contributions lay people can provide that otherwise would not 
be represented in biobank governance. In what sense is there such a thing as lay 
expertise, and when is it needed? When we have answered these questions, we are in a 
better position for deciding how to engage lay people in order to bring out this kind of 
expert knowledge. 
 
The rise of lay expertise 
 
Lindsay Prior explores the emergence of the concept of “lay expertise” as connected 
to the “legitimation crisis during the late 20th century” of medicine and other 
professional activities, which has lead to an interest in the particular knowledge lay 
people possess, as well as a “tendency to argue that lay knowledge can be every bit as 
valuable as professional knowledge.” 3 Prior does not contest the value of lay 
experiences in understanding health issues, but doubts the suitability of calling this 
expertise. In health matters, lay expertise consists of experience, but “experiential 
knowledge is invariably limited, and idiosyncratic” and “lay people can be wrong.”4 
But expert knowledge is also limited and quite often wrong, too, so this cannot be 
sufficient evidence for discounting the notion of lay expertise. The idiosyncrasy or 
particularity of lay experience may not always be the drawback Prior implies. We 
know that testing general hypotheses on particular instances is the paradigmatic 
scientific exercise. Aristotle stresses that practical wisdom (phronesis) is not only 
universal knowledge, but as much about particular instances, and “some people who 
lack knowledge but have experience are better in action than others who have 
knowledge.”5 Aristotle’s emphasis on the value of experience is particularly relevant 
for inexact, interpretive areas of knowledge such as health issues or areas of 
significant complexity, which involve a wide range of different actors with 
incompatible values and interests. Needless to say, Prior recognises that lay people 
have important contributions to make, which supplement expert knowledge, and his 
critique of the way “lay expertise” has been used within sociology of health is 
reasonable. Still, some of the reasons for the paradoxical notion are missed if we 
accept his critique. I will explore the normative reasons for involving lay people in 
biobank governance through describing four different meanings of “lay expertise”, 
and analyse what kinds of involvement the different understandings of the term imply.  
 
Lay expert I: The educated Rita 
 
In the movie “Educating Rita” we meet an ordinary working-class girl who wishes to 
enter the halls of higher learning and therefore enrols at the Open University. She 
succeeds in her endeavour but on the way she also discovers the hollowness of the 
knowledge that seemed so important to her. Some of the basic problems with 
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theoretical education of people with rich experiential knowledge raised by this movie 
are echoed in the first understanding of “lay expertise”; the education of lay people 
into quasi-experts on a particular issue or technology. People with a generally 
accepted expert status teach lay people how the technology works, what resources it 
demands, the associated benefits, risks and uncertainties, as well as what and who are 
affected by the technology. As we see from this open-ended list, different kinds of 
experts are needed to educate lay people.  
 
Typical examples of the kind of educational processes that create lay experts are the 
consensus conference and the citizen’s jury, but other expert-dominated consultation 
approaches serve the same purpose.6 A consensus conference involves a lay panel of 
10 to 14 interested lay people with varied socio-demographic backgrounds, who are 
not interested enough to have expert knowledge on the relevant issues. They are given 
background reading material and then gathered for discussions with, and provided 
information by, a wide range of experts. A list of potential experts is drawn up by the 
expert-based steering committee, the lay panel suggests who they want to invite, but 
the committee has the final word on who will actually appear.7 This is reasonable, 
considering that it is difficult for non-experts to recognise who is an expert; it takes 
one to know one. The final result of the conference is a document, preferably without 
dissenting opinions, where “argumentative evaluations and recommendations are 
given by the lay panel on the measures called for in the various fields covered by the 
topic.”8 The objective of this “fairly complicated method of technology assessment” 
is “to bridge the gap between the general public, experts and politicians”, to engag
public and experts in dialogue, and the Danish Board of Technology 
e 
 
is convinced that the process is fruitful and that it contributes to the 
general public’s and politician’s acknowledgement of the necessity 
for increased understanding of and participation in the debate 
surrounding new technology. 
 
The lay people selected for the panel are given prior information enabling them to 
enter into a dialogue with experts and, on this basis, to make recommendations to 
politicians. One interesting question regarding this version of lay involvement is why 
lay people rather than the experts themselves should evaluate and recommend 
political measures, given that the experts are the ones with knowledge which provide 
basis for the evaluations. Does the lay panel recommend different measures than the 
experts would? It is unlikely that their conclusion is different from the 
recommendations of all the experts, since the expert group includes a diversity of 
views, and studies of the citizen’s jury approach show lay recommendations being 
“remarkably close” to the expert advice.9 As there is a strong pressure towards 
consensus in the lay panel, we can assume a conservative bias in their policy 
recommendations. It is easier to agree on keeping things as they are than to agree on 
untried changes with far-reaching consequences, especially if one is not an expert on 
the issue and must choose to trust one or a few of several apparently very competent 
people with diverging views. 
 
Irrespective of the correctness of this assumption about a conservative bias, we may 
still ask why it is important that the lay panel does not have any strong prior 
knowledge or represent any particular interest group involved in the issues under 
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discussion. The reason seems to be that lay people see problems and solutions that the 
experts miss. They are not immersed in a particular way of perceiving the world, and 
are free of some prejudices or ground assumptions that are part of the scientific 
education and training. As the lay people are presented with these differing views as 
seen from within the expert culture, the assumption seems to be that they are able to 
evade being drawn into the scientific mindset and keep their outsider perspective 
while they learn from the experts. This is of course very optimistic and quite contrary 
to the message of “Educating Rita”: gaining new knowledge implies as much learning 
a new way to regard the world. Kerr et al describe how several lay consultations of 
this kind turned into events where 
 
The selection of speakers and the format of speaker-audience 
interactions are obvious ways in which expert positions were 
privileged, even when space was made for lay contributions from the 
podium or the floor. 10 
 
Thus the educational model of lay expertise exemplified in consensus conferences and 
similar approaches may mean that we lose the most valuable contribution of lay 
people, namely lay independence from the expert’s perspective and thereby their 
ability to serve as a corrective to this perspective.  
 
Lay experts II and III: The autodidact and the sage 
 
Consensus conferences exclude people with a particular interest in the issues at stake, 
and thus had acquired more than ordinary knowledge of those issues. But it is strange 
to avoid lay people that “can (and sometimes have to) turn themselves into experts in 
order to challenge medical hegemony.”11 The crucial difference between these 
autodidact experts and those who are trained in the consensus conference process is 
that the autodidacts have themselves decided what knowledge they need and where to 
find it. Thus they may be driven by exactly those particular values and perspectives 
that distinguish them from the expert culture, ie, the way of seeing that may function 
as a corrective to that of the experts. One example of an influential group of 
autodidacts in the genetics debate is members of the disability movement, who have 
had significant impact.12 
 
As we know both from science and arts, this is a risky way to gain knowledge, due to 
the lack of correction from a community of peers, especially in an age of increasingly 
complex and specialised knowledge, with a wide array of information and 
disinformation available on the internet. In addition it is a fact that in areas of 
technology governance, expertise requires not only theoretical knowledge but also 
extensive practical training. Understanding the issues at stake in the establishment and 
use of genetic databases requires working knowledge of medical diagnostics, genetics, 
epidemiology, bioethics, sociology and anthropology. And “for most parts, lay people 
are not experts”,13 at least not to this degree. The same can be said about 
philosophers, sociologists and most of the others who participate as experts in the 
biobank debate and other complex issues, because their expertise is restricted to 
particular aspects of the issue under discussion. But they have a clearly delimited area 
of expertise, and are recognised by their peers and the society at large as experts. Lay
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actually have the required degree of specialised knowledge are the recognised exp




14 but later expand this group to include those whose 
“expertise would be continuous with the core-set’s expertise”,15 which makes it 
possible to include the autodidact as well as the lay expertise of the sage.  
 
“The sage” is a stakeholder who has particular experientially based knowledge. These 
lay people are often portrayed as wise old men or women, but this group includes any 
lay person who is affected in a particular way by the technology in question and who 
possesses relevant knowledge connected to the way they are affected. In this case it is 
not a matter of regarding the same facts differently from the core-scientists but of 
having experience-based supplementary knowledge beyond the common knowledge 
of the relevant society. This knowledge can be acquired in many different ways, as 
long as the main element is non-theoretical. A prime example is the Cumbrian sheep 
farmers as Wynne contrasts them with the scientific experts in the management of the 
effects of the Chernobyl disaster. He describes how  
 
the farmers felt that their whole identity was under threat from 
outside interventions based upon what they saw as ignorant but 
arrogant experts who did not recognize what was the central 
currency of the farmer’s social identity, namely their specialist hill 
farming expertise.16 
 
Collins and Evans understand Wynne’s distinction between scientific and lay 
expertise as one between two different kinds of knowledge in need of translation by 
someone with “interactional expertise” in order to gain a higher level of combined 
knowledge.17 This understanding of this kind of non-expert knowledge, as a unique 
source of knowledge that can and should supplement the scientific expert knowledge 
as equally valuable, is a common one. Wynne, however, goes one step further. By 
juxtaposing the farmer’s practical expertise based on socially and experientially 
acquired knowledge with the scientist’s theoretically-based knowledge, Wynne paints 
a picture of a flexible and reflexive knowledge system accepting intrinsic uncertainty 
and ignorance quite different from a science driven “towards unrealism, insensitivity 
to uncertainty and variability, and incapable of admitting its own limits”.18 In reply to 
Collins and Evans, Wynne rejects their reading of his study as revealing two 
compatible sources of propositional knowledge. We should not include lay opinion in 
order to supplement scientific expertise with an equally important form of expertise in 
order to get a better and more complex understanding of the issue. The lay expertise 
of the sheep farmers represented an alternative to the scientific understanding of what 
was at stake in the aftermath of the Chernobyl radioactive pollution.19 The Cumbrian 
sheep farmers as understood by Collins and Evans are representatives of “the sage” 
lay expertise, whereas Wynne’s own understanding of their role in public debate 
points out a fourth understanding of the term. I return to this below.  
 
The autodidact and the sage are two different, but related lay experts. They are 
themselves in control of where to acquire their knowledge and how to use it, unlike 
the “educated Rita”, and they play the role of alternative voices to the science experts. 
This lay expertise is the kind that is often sought in sociological and ethical studies of 
science, by surveys and focus group interviews, as well as in the consultation kind of 
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public engagement, such as has been held for the proposed UK Biobank.20 The 
expertise sought in these contexts may be deemed valuable and interesting in some 
cases where they have genuine contributions. In medical diagnostics, the patient is an 
expert on his own story, just as the Cumbrian farmers knew the patterns of rainfall 
and how the sheep grazed on the hillsides of the Lake District. The patient with a 
particular difficult inherited disease may read advanced medical literature about his 
own condition and combine it with observations, in order to know more both in theory 
and practice about his own condition than most of the specialists he encounters. Still, 
these lay experts play on the scientists’ field, and the soundness of their expertise is 
judged according to how it fits in with the scientific “core-set” expertise. Thus, 
conceived in this way, lay expertise can only challenge scientific expertise on details 
within the scientists’ own language and world-view, but cannot question that world-
view itself. Collins and Evans argue that lay people with experiential expertise should 
retain an expert status, whereas Prior seems to think lay people have even less to offer 
when he suggests it is 
 
time to recognise the virtues of expertise, and not to confuse issues 
concerning the use and manipulation of technical knowledge (the 
realm of expertise) with the worthy political aim of ensuring 
participation and consultation of the lay public in all matters to do 
with medicine.21 
 
Both articles fail to present a view of lay experts as people who are able to raise an 
alternative to the scientific world-view. Their expertise is merely an appendix to the 
scientific expertise, and it is not regarded as independent of the perspective already 
accepted in the scientific world-view. From the history of science we know that one of 
the primary strengths of science is its anti-dogmatic approach, including a systematic 
openness to internal and external criticism. The most interesting kind of lay expertise 
is the one that can serve as a corrective to the accepted views of science, exposing its 
limits as well as its strengths. This is of course something both the autodidact and the 
sage can do, but not within the framework envisaged by Prior or Collins and Evans, 
however right they may be in their implicit claim that science is our primary source of 
knowledge. To capture this potential strength of lay knowledge, we must regard it as 
an independent source of knowledge, as something independent of the approach of 
experts. 
 
Lay expert IV: The clear-sighted 
 
“Lay expert” appears to be an oxymoron, but in a society with a growing class of 
highly educated specialists, a significant proportion of the citizens can be regarded as 
experts in particular fields of knowledge. In addition, experts play an increasingly 
active role in a number of areas in society, giving advice both in professional as well 
as in private life. The expert has become a common part of public life, not an outsider 
that gets involved merely in extraordinary circumstances of problem-solving. In such 
a society the lay person is not merely negatively defined as someone who lacks a 
particular kind of competence, but rather as someone who stands outside and inhabits 
the common world of human experience, where expert knowledge is a particular, 
privileged form of experience. Thus the lay person has a particular kind of experience 
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that the expert cannot have; namely access to this non-specialised perspective on the 
issue. Here lay expertise is the expertise of not being an expert. 
 
One well-known example of this kind of expertise is the one demonstrated by the little 
child in H. C. Andersen’s fairytale “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. In this story, the 
Emperor is tricked by two conmen into believing that they made the most exquisite 
clothing of a garment that is invisible to those who are stupid or unsuitable for their 
office. Nobody would admit that they did not see the clothes when the emperor wore 
the non-existing clothes through the town, except a little boy who exclaims that the 
emperor has no clothes.22 The child is not mislead by the accepted perspective on 
things and is able to see the events with fresh eyes. I want to stress that I do not think 
that the scientific culture ever leads us into the kind of misconceptions described in 
Andersen’s fairytale, but science can be corrected by someone who has less formal 
training and a different approach to the issue. Such lay experts serve the role of the 
clear-sighted, because they are able to “see” the world differently so as to correct the 
scientific view. Calling them “clear-sighted” does not imply that lay people usually 
are right, but to indicate their potential corrective role. 
 
There is a long tradition of contrasting formal training with common sense, showing 
how the sound understanding of ordinary people is superior to the rigid and narrow-
minded formalism of academic expertise. Even the story told by Wynne belongs to 
this genre; the reflexive farmers who realise the limits of both their own and the 
experts’ knowledge versus the arrogant and inflexible expertise: 
 
The scientists on the other hand were expressing and reproducing 
their intellectual-administrative framework of prediction, 
standardization and control, in which uncertainties were ‘naturally’ 
deleted, and contextual objects, such as the farmers and their farms, 
were standardized and ‘black-boxed’ in ways consistent with this 
cultural idiom.  Whatever private awareness they may or may not 
have had of the cultural limits and precommitments of their science, 
they successfully suppressed these.23  
 
This should not be read as a rejection of scientific expertise, but as an attempt at 
describing its limitations. The central concept for the understanding of the lay expert 
as clear-sighted is common sense. Science is methodologically restricted, whereas 
common sense draws on feelings, judgements and reasoning in combination, and 
cannot be precise in the way science is. The scientific method gives reproducible 
results and is generally applicable, while common sense is able to disclose particular 
instances as well as complexities that escape the generalising methodology of science. 
This enables non-experts to see aspects of reality or ask questions that are closed to 
the scientific expertise.  
 
Lay people’s concerns must, however, be made accessible to the policy makers as 
well as to the scientific expertise in order to have an impact. Collins and Evans24 are 
right in pointing out the necessity of translation in order to establish well-functioning 
communication between the different groups involved in technology governance. 
Involving lay people not as experts continuous with science experts, but as an 
alternative corrective, enable us to tap into a different kind of knowledge and 
experience. They are, in a sense, untainted by scientific knowledge and culture, and 
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can provide a different perspective from the ones presented by diverse expert groups. 
Therefore they are able to draw on traditional sources of knowledge and produce fresh 
analogies with everyday cases in the way that we who have this kind of systematic 
knowledge are unable to. It is this kind of “clear-sighted” lay expertise that is most 
interesting when discussing why, and in what way we should involve lay people in 
biobank governance. 
 
These four versions of lay expertise are partly overlapping, but there are distinct 
differences indicating how we value lay contributions to the debate. But to know 
which approach we should take to lay involvement, we must determine why lay 
people should be involved. In the biobank debate we primarily need lay people to 
provide an outsider perspective, in order to raise the discussion at a more basic level, 
considering what kind of society, health service and medical research we want, and 
how genetic databases are conducive to these overarching goals. 
 
Ignorance as expertise? 
 
A fairly common view among scientists and other experts is that lay people present 
not as much an alternative understanding of reality as a misunderstood understanding 
of reality, and we have good reason to investigate this possibility closer.25 Unlike the 
picture painted by Wynne and others, one can argue that lay people are not more 
reflexive and responsive to the limits of their own understanding than scientists, but 
build their opinion on ill-informed prejudices and mistaken assumption. They can be 
just as unaware of their cultural limits as the scientists, as well as obviously wrong in 
their beliefs. I will modify this picture later, but if we first take a look at some of the 
support for this lay ignorance approach, we find one example among the early 
‘consultations’ preparing the establishment of the UK Biobank: 
 
The use of human biological samples in genetics research is less 
readily accepted, largely because genetics and genetics research are 
much misunderstood and have many unhelpful (and ill-informed) 
associations. There is a case for informing the general public about 
genetics research as well as its applications, particularly in relation 
to disease specific research, and its preventative potential.26  
 
A classic example of lay ignorance of technology issues is found in the series of 
Eurobarometer-surveys on public conceptions of biotechnology from 1996 to 2002, 
which showed that a stable one-third of the European population agreed to the 
statement: “Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified 
tomatoes do”.27 Admittedly, the large number of wrong answers can partly be due to 
misunderstandings of the question rather than ignorance, but still there is a case for 
claiming that lay people often misunderstand central issues because they lack the 
training that enable them to grasp the scientific and technological facts.28 
 
But lay people are neither more nor less stupid than experts and many admit that they 
have this insufficient grasp, as a man from Manchester expressed when discussing the 
role of lay people in the Oversight Body of the UK Biobank: “I wouldn’t have a clue 
what’s going on”.29 Most of the participants in this consultation found a role for lay 
participation in the body but emphasised the need for “professional people, who know 
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what’s going on”.30 This is supported by statements from other surveys of people 
participating in existing biobanks, such as a Swedish one in Umeå31 and the 
Norwegian HUNT Biobank.32 Similar results are also reported from research on 
blood donors to genetic research in the UK33, but it is important to stress that these 
studies do not show a lack of ability to understand, only that these respondents fin
this knowledge unnecessary or irrelevant. To summarise the findings: (1) Lay people 
often have insufficient knowledge to understand the issues at stake; (2) they know that 
they have this insufficient grasp; (3) they accept their insufficient knowledge. Many
lay people prefer that trustworthy experts govern the activity, rather than leavi
responsibility with lay people. Few lay people wish to go through demanding learning 
processes in order to gain sufficient understanding as long as they trust the people in 





This humility may seem to contradict Wynne’s account of the Lake District farmers 
who disagreed with the expertise and questioned their competence. However, if we 
look closer at the different accounts, we find that the similarities are as significant as 
the differences. In both cases we find lay people who reflect on the limits of their own 
knowledge, and who express awareness of the uncertainties of human existence. The 
main difference is that the participants trust the Scandinavian biobanks because they 
are represented by people they trust and because the activity is regulated by 
authorities they trust. The trust is not built on information and consent, but rather on 
the relation between the participants and the representatives of the research activity, 
be it a nurse, a doctor or a researcher. In Wynne’s account distrust replaces trust, but 
his study also emphasises the significance of the relation between lay people and 
experts: 
 
Trust, or trustworthiness, and credibility are relational terms, about 
the nature of the social relationship between the actors concerned. 
They are not intrinsic to either actor nor to the information said to 
be transmitted between them.34 
 
The sheep farmers had experience-based reasons for distrusting the scientists, and to 
seek their own understanding of the issues at stake. In a world where the experts 
established a good relationship with the farmers by listening to their concerns and 
expressing humility as to the predictive quality of their own approach, a more trusting 
relationship would probably ensue. It is not an inherent trait of science to be arrogant 
and dogmatic; it is merely a part of some pockets of scientific culture. Also, the 
farmers were aware of their own ignorance just as the biobank donors were. Such 
reflection on one’s own ignorance is a central part of their kind of competence, but 
unlike the Scandinavian lay people, they also possessed unique expertise connected to 
their own life and profession. But in matters of biobank research, we seldom find the 
“sage” kind of lay expertise, because the issues are not local but general, and 
understanding them apparently requires a certain degree of academic training.  
 
So, if biobank governance involves lay people who discuss from a position of 
ignorance and know that they expose their ignorance when they participate, they will 
neither be heard nor respected. This is hardly a good model for governance, and we 
would be better off with a well-functioning technocracy consisting of trustworthy 
experts. The Norwegian HUNT Biobank is an interesting case in this respect. It is 
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locally run and the participants from the Nord-Trøndelag county have a high degree of 
trust in the local researchers and the Norwegian regulation of research. They have no 
need to participate in governance of the biobank research as long as they see their 
interests being taken care of by trustworthy professionals and regulatory systems. But 
we know that such trust is fragile and only one scandal is sufficient to destroy it. 
Involving lay people can be seen as a preventive measure to ensure the stability of 
trust, on a par with other trust-supporting strategies such as openness and 
accountability.35 It turns out that the moment lay people cease to trust the experts, 
they are not as ignorant as they themselves and some scientists hold. This is expressed 
by a supporter of the participation of lay people in the Biobank Oversight Body: 
 
I think sometimes medical people and scientists can get lost in a little 
world of their own without getting their feet on the ground. Maybe 
someone could hold them down on the ground a bit and show how it 
affects normal folks.36 
 
What is expressed here is the role of lay people as clear-sighted articulators of 
common sense, as a watch-dog against technocratic excesses. They do not have to 
have specialised knowledge in epidemiology or genetics to have a role to play in 
biobank governance. Quite the contrary: they should not have any such expertise in 
order to play their role. Only then are they able to provide correctives to the scientists’ 
tendencies to getting lost in their own perception of the world.  
 
Normative arguments for lay participation 
 
If we look for normative reasons for engaging lay people, at least two different lines 
of argument have been central to the debate. The first one holds that anybody who is 
affected by a proposed activity should have a say in the regulation of this activity. 
They should be heard because they are stakeholders. Ravetz37 starts with the fact that 
in normal scientific activity we require that projects are subject to scientific peer 
reviews in order to secure acceptable quality. The case is different when the scientific 
activity is moved out of the laboratory into the complex physical and social reality 
beyond controlled experiments. Under such conditions we have what he calls “post-
normal science”, an activity where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high 
and decisions are urgent” and we need an extended peer review, involving 
representatives of all affected parties.38 It is a sound moral principle that those who 
are affected by planned activity should take part in deciding how the activity should 
proceed, as long as they are capable of deciding what is best for them. This principle 
is supported both by deontological and by utilitarian arguments.39 For Ravetz, the 
reason for including lay people is not primarily ethical, but a matter of securing 
scientific quality in a state of scientific uncertainty. The scientists cannot achieve the 
ideal of value-free science, as is commonly pointed out in literature on the sociology 
of science, and therefore they will always be influenced by particular commitments 
and interests. Thus the debate of the ‘extended peer community’ aims to disclose such 
interests: 
 
Since uncertainty cannot be tamed by statistical techniques whose 
value-commitments are concealed, debates will explicitly involve the 
participants’ different agendas and perspectives.40 
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In this way experts and lay participants can engage in a process of mutual learning, 
which is the best way to reach good scientific quality, according to Ravetz. 
 
This approach also illustrates some of the problems of stakeholder models for public 
engagement in that a stakeholder is someone with interests to protect in particular 
matters. The approach implies that the more affected a person is, the stronger his 
claim on a decisive voice in the proceedings is. The core of his participation is not as 
an expert with particular knowledge, but as one who is representing his own interests 
in an interest-based discussion. But such discussions are generally more directed at 
negotiations and compromises than at finding the best solution for society at large. 
There is also greater risk of insoluble value conflicts because different interests are 
supported by different kinds of values, as was demonstrated in the communication 
between the scientists and the sheep farmers in Wynne’s account. Then we get 
politicisation of science with negotiations between different interests and values 
where the political strength of the participants becomes crucial for the outcome. Even 
if the stated aim of stakeholder involvement is trust based on respect, it is in reality a 
conflict-based model. The legitimacy and stability of decision depends on the stability 
of the power relations. 
 
In Ravetz’s model, we as citizens are holders of certain rights that we can promote in 
the extended peer review process, which is, therefore, a liberalistic model. The 
alternative, the deliberative democracy approach, points in a more republican 
direction. Policy should be built on public deliberation where the fundamental 
demand is that opinions should be supported by reasons. 
 
The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their 
representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals 
who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably 
reject. … They are reasons that should be accepted by free and 
equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.41 
 
The normative basis for the requirement is that people should have the right to take 
part in the governance of society in order “to produce a justifiable decision and to 
express the value of mutual respect”.42 But this requires that the reasons given are 
presented publicly and that they are accessible to everybody in the sense that they 
should be able to understand the reasons even if they fail to agree with them. The 
debate itself should be open-ended; even binding decisions “must be open to 
challenge at some point in the future”.43 Unlike the stakeholder approach discussed 
above, the focus of the debate is not the political struggle to preserve one’s own 
interests but the provision of arguments that are convincing also to others who have 
diverging interests to protect. Thus we aim for the better argument in a common 
pursuit of the good, not merely the arguments that support our own causes. Policy 
decisions should be based on an open public discussion where we recognise that there 
is a plurality of values in society and where we have mutual respect for each other’s 
deliberative capacity. We do not know who is going to present the decisive arguments 
and the aim of this discussion is to get the best argument as basis for policy decisions. 
In this context lay people are regarded as equally rational to the experts although they 
are informed by other values and viewpoints. People should participate in governance, 
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ie, public debate leading to policy decisions, because their contribution is of value for 
society.  
 
The fundamental normative ideal underlying the deliberative democracy approach is 
deontological, emphasising respect for the unique value of every human being. This 
ideal is expressed in the absolute rejection of coercion and deception of others, as well 
as in regarding the communicative community as the final court of decision in moral 
and political matters.44 On the surface, one could think that even utilitarian reasoning 
could support a deliberative democracy approach because the goal of the deliberation 
is finding the common good. Of course, it is debatable whether an approach 
presupposing freedom and equality for every human being is compatible with 
utilitarian thinking,45 but regardless of that question there is a significant difference in 
that the procedure rather than the substance is crucial in a deliberative democracy 
approach, as it is in deontology. In utilitarianism, the criterion for deciding the value 
of a course of action is the overall consequences. If it contributes to general well-
being, the act is morally good. Contrast this with the deliberative democracy approach 
where the criterion is whether everybody has been able to participate in the debate, 
indicating that the goal is part of the deliberation – together with the debate on how to 
reach this goal. The right course of action is the one that is determined through the 
right procedure, not the one that is determined by a particular principle. This parallels 
the Kantian determination of the form of the rule as determining its morality rather 
than the content.46 
 
The deliberative democracy approach is procedural, and even if we disagree with the 
actual conclusion of the deliberation we can still accept the result as the outcome of a 
fair and reasonable procedure where everybody is given equal opportunity to 
influence the outcome by participating in deliberation. It is easy to engage experts and 
politicians in public deliberation on technology regulation, whereas lay people are 
more reluctant, due to their lack of technical knowledge of the issues involved as well 
as of the relevant laws and regulations. But if only decisions based on open and 
inclusive public debate are ethically legitimate, lay people should participate in these 
deliberations. This is not because we want them to protect their own interests and 
values, but in order to include their perspective and understanding of the situation. 
Then their values are included in the discussion as part of a common pursuit of the 
best understanding of the issues at stake, and not as a part of political negotiations 
between parties with diverging interests. This approach includes the stakeholder 
perspective, but directs the attention away from lay people as representing interests, 
and towards lay people as providers of valuable knowledge and alternative 
worldviews. It is closer to Wynne’s understanding of the lay expert as someone who 
can raise a fundamental discussion of ethical worldviews than to Collins and Evans’s 
notion of lay people as supplementing the core expertise. In biobank governance 
where everybody is a stakeholder, seeking alternative understandings of how society 
should relate to new technological opportunities should be the main reason for 
including lay people. 
 
The deliberative democracy approach shares one crucial weakness with the 
stakeholder approach, a weakness that is a fundamental challenge to technology 
governance: lay people rarely wish to participate. Why should they participate in this 
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discussion? Most people want to participate when they see that there is something at 
stake for them, but the issues concerning biobank regulation are vague and technically 
complicated, lacking any clear relevance for the public. Some engaged citizens will 
probably participate because they wish to learn more, and others belong to patient 
activist groups and other NGOs with a considerable degree of knowledge and a wish 
to influence policy. These groups will usually fall into the Educated Rita and the 
Autodidact categories respectively. Since the main aim in this context is to decide 
how to bring into play the knowledge resources of the expertise of not being an 
expert, the Clear-sighted, we aim for engaging those who initially do not want to get 
engaged. Obviously they will not see how they themselves could contribute to 
regulation of issues that they have no particular wish to understand. Both motivation 
and information are lacking.  
 
If we accept this description, the question is what kind of lay involvements will 
motivate and bring out the alternative perspectives of the “lay expert”. As already 
indicated, the kind of consultation processes found in consensus conferences, citizen’s 
juries and open meetings have some fundamental weaknesses, as they are often 
dominated or even manipulated by organisers, experts, or activists, even if these 
consultation methods may have other valuable aspects. We should keep in mind that 
whatever way we organise lay involvement, the important work is not done in the 
consultation process itself, but in the informed debate leading to political decisions, 
and it is contributions to this debate we aim for. Perhaps the best approach is focus 
group interviews or similar approaches, such as the Democs card game.47 These more 
or less open interpersonal engagement methods may be followed up by more 
structured individual interviews in order to elaborate interesting ideas. Lay people, 
especially those who are reluctant to participate in a debate because they regard 
themselves as ignorant of the biobank issues, can be reached in these kinds of 
approaches. The main benefit of such engagement processes is that the participants 
will only be discussing with their peers, and need not fear appearing as ignorant. Then 
one can create the ideal conditions for bringing out alternative perspectives on issues 
relating to biobank governance.  
 
Creating debate between people with similar backgrounds may also be a way to 
benefit from the group polarisation phenomenon, ie, that “members of a deliberating 
group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by 
the members’ predeliberation tendencies”. 48 Shakespeare, Scully and Banks illustrate 
the positive effects of using focus groups with follow-up interviews among non-
experts in their ongoing Ordinary Ethics project, which studies opinions on prenatal 
sex selection. They are able to draw out interesting arguments countering the 
dominant bioethics expert views: 
 
Most had a very strong intuition about it at the start of the 
discussion, and very few changed their mind. What the group 
discussion enabled them to do was to clarify and articulate their 
moral reasoning behind their intuition. Importantly, we have been 
able to show that public responses to these issues are not based on 
unthinking, knee-jerk prejudice. Lay people use a variety of 
evaluative approaches and moral resources, including personal 
experience, analogies with similar situations, and hypothetical 
reasoning.49 
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Levitt and Weldon emphasise that focus group interviews can “provide the context or 
personal history of people’s responses” which is particularly important for privacy 
and trust, key issues in the ethics of biobanking.50 In addition, this approach enabled 
them to “explore how people use their existing knowledge to make sense of a new 
issue.”51 One could argue that the issues that were of concern for the participants in 
this study are ones already present in the debate, such as genetic exceptionalism, 
privacy, commercialisation, containment of information flow and potential for harm, 
making lay contribution superfluous in biobank governance. But that is not the case, 
as the lay people had their own approach to issues such as research priorities, funding 
and who should benefit from this kind of research. Their concern was not primarily 
individualistic, as the expert debate focussing on informed consent tends to be, 
showing that this kind of lay engagement provides an alternative perspective valuable 
to the debate.52 
 
These opinions provide background material for the informed discussions in scientific 
journals and in the political debate.  The aim is to have informed discussion where lay 
opinions are included in a language that makes an impact. This requires a translation 
and clarification of the lay position as demonstrated in several of the studies discussed 
here. Such presentation of lay perspectives requires both competence in analysis of 
interview material and willingness to be informed by non-experts. 
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